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This article argues that the time has come to
examine security implications of identity conflicts
not in terms of conventional security analysis that
deals with the ‘physical’ dimension of violent
conflict, but more particularly its human security
dimension, i.e. the extent to which these conflicts
affect people’s freedom from want and fear and
their need for respect. Recognition of and respect
for different cultural, religious and ethnic
identities is an aspect of human security.
In countries like Sudan, Lebanon, Iraq, Palestine
and Algeria, violent conflicts have led to the loss
of hundreds of thousands of lives. They have also
affected other dimensions of human security
such as levels of unemployment, poverty, health
and personal security. In Sudan, Iraq, Algeria
and the Palestinian Territories, levels of
unemployment have run close to one-quarter of
the whole population, with standards of living
falling dramatically. Those most victimised by
these conflicts were expectedly those living in
combat zones in Southern Sudan and Darfur, in
the Kurdish region in Iraq and the poor
communities in Lebanon and Palestinians of
Gaza, who were subjected to the brutal Israeli
military onslaught which began on 26 December
2008 (UNDP 2009, forthcoming).
But in what senses have these and other conflicts
in the Arab region been identity conflicts? And is
there a germ of violent conflict in all situations
involving differences of identity? The obvious
answer to the latter is that this is not always the
case. While identity differences have given rise
to inter-group tensions and conflicts in some
countries, in other countries groups claiming
different identities have coexisted peacefully
over long periods of time. Nevertheless, conflicts
apparently rooted in differences of identity have
continued to draw the attention of scholars and
the general public in the Arab world.
1 Multiple markers of identity and how they
frame conflicts in the Arab world
Those who argue that conflicts are rooted in
primordial loyalties, based on the latent
solidarities within ethnic groups contend that
when disputes arise, members of concerned
groups unthinkingly take the side of their fellows
from the same identity group against the
‘others’. They react under the impulse of what
they sense to be bonds of kinship amounting
almost to blood ties with those of their group
(Connor 1994).
This short article argues against this kind of
reasoning as applied to the Arab world, on several
grounds. To start with, there are numerous types
of identity in the Arab world. Some are based on
primordial loyalties inherited at birth (Geertz
1994), but others are ignited by ideological or
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political differences. Scholars interested in ethnic
conflict classify the dividing lines among people
living in the Arab world in a number of ways,
including religion, language and race. They
acknowledge three major religions (i.e. Islam,
Christianity and Judaism), with a smaller number
of animists mostly in Sudan. Linguistically, while
Arabic is spoken by the majority in the Arab
world, there are important minorities speaking
other languages, such as Kurdish in Iraq and
Syria, Berber in North African countries and a
variety of African languages in Sudan.
Additionally, some identities are rooted in
sectarian or community ties, such as those of
Sunnis and Shi’is as well as those of the Druze
and Alawites, who all claim to be Muslims.
Similar sectarian divisions are found among
Christian Arabs who belong to denominations,
such as Copts, Greek Orthodox, Catholics and
Protestants, to name the largest. In some cases,
people could share the same religion and
communal origin, but differ in terms of their
tribal descent. This is the case in Gulf countries,
Yemen and Somalia (Ibrahim 1998: 229–42).
Yet primordial loyalties are by no means the only
identity markers. Just as important are markers
of political identity, the most important expression
of which concerns membership of political
movements. Thus, there exist Arab Nationalists,
Marxists, Nasserites, Liberals and Islamists. The
latter in particular have become the dominant
opposition group in most Arab countries.
Furthermore, primordialist interpretations of
conflict gloss over divisions within the same
identity group. As evident, for example, in Iraq,
competing factions within the same ethnic group
fought and continue to fight with one another.
The Shi’i followers of Muqtada Al-Sadr have
raised arms against other Shi’i militias. The two
Kurdish parties in Northern Iraq were involved
in heavy fighting with each other in 1994 and
1996, which was halted only after lengthy
mediation efforts by US officials (Ghareeb 2003:
180). The last episodes of the Lebanese civil war
were marked by fierce fighting opposing
Christian factions (Corm 2005: 408–16). The last
confrontation, in 2006–8, between the Loyalists
and the Opposition in Lebanon placed both
Christians and Sunnis in opposing camps.
Another argument against primordialist
interpretations of identity-framed conflicts is
that multiplicity of identities for any individual is
usually the rule. Identities tend to be socially
constructed according to context. Members of a
group sharing certain objective traits, like a
common religion, language or territorial origin
most likely have other traits that they share with
other groups. Which of these identities prevails
in any situation depends on the circumstances.
Conflict situations are characterised by
significant manipulation of such identity
markers, a phenomenon to which writers, poets,
novelists, singers and political activists
contribute. The former often stress the common
heritage of their own group, while the latter
diffuse the image of a polarised society divided
into a dominant group and a persecuted one in
order to augment their political capital.
In other Arab countries, political violence has
arisen for reasons having little or nothing to do
with ethnic and other divisions. The bloodiest
instance was the civil war in Algeria, which began
in 1992 and lasted for almost a decade. Domestic
violence on a lower scale also erupted in other
Arab countries, including Syria in the late 1970s
and early 1980s; Egypt in the 1980s until 1997;
Saudi Arabia since 1979 and Yemen since 2001.
While the antagonists in these cases have
included young Islamists on one side and
government forces and secularist intellectuals on
the other side, it would be misleading to associate
Islam per se with armed opposition to the
government. In fact, the militant Islamists who
took up arms usually constituted a small fraction
of the Islamist movement.1 The broadest part of
this movement is made up of people who abide
very much by the rules of a peaceful political
game. The greatest successes of the Islamist
movement have been registered by those who
have sought to reach power through elections.
If it is not true that mere differences of identity
necessarily give rise to inter-group tension and
conflicts, why does it seem that groups claiming
different identities find themselves divided into
hostile camps in the Arab world, as in other parts
of the world? And what are the security
implications of such conflicts of identity?
2 Identity politics and national security
Identity politics plays out in many different ways,
not all of them leading to the eruption of conflict
(Luckham et al. 2006: 4–9), as demonstrated in
several Arab countries where differences of
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identity, primordial or political, did not lead either
to open tension or violent conflict. Morocco,
Tunisia and Jordan since 1970 are such examples.
There are Amazigh populations in Morocco and
Tunisia and Christians and Circassians in
Jordan, but all three countries have been more or
less free of ethnic conflict since their
independence. In Morocco in particular as
Geertz (1994) has observed, primordial divisions
between Arabs and Amazighs did not produce
differentiated political identities or conflicts
between them – in contrast to Indonesia, where
primordial loyalties gave rise to several bloody
conflicts. What prevailed there was more a
multitude of personal loyalties closer to the
patron–client relationships as described in detail
by Gellner and Waterbury (1977).
One might object to Jordan’s inclusion in this
grouping, arguing that the so-called Black
September episode in 1970 indicated ethnic
conflict since the antagonists were Palestinian
combatants and the Jordanian army. Some
Jordanians also feel that Palestinians who have
acquired Jordanian nationality exert too much
control over the economy and represent a large
portion of the country’s intelligentsia. However,
such feelings have not produced protracted
conflict. The 1970 confrontation did not pit
Palestinians against Jordanians but particular
armed Palestinian groups against the security
forces of the Jordanian government which,
encouraged by the USA, did not want these
armed groups to become a state within the state.
Syria occupies a unique place as it seems
presently to be largely free of ethnic tensions,
despite skirmishes between the government
forces and the Kurdish population on several
occasions since 2003. Several observers would
find an ethnic element in the confrontation
between members of the Muslim Brotherhood
and the Syrian government, particularly in the
late 1970s and early 1980s. The Muslim
Brotherhood perceived the Ba’ath government to
be dominated by Alawis, whom they do not
consider Muslims. The assault on the Military
Academy of Hama in 1982 targeted military
cadets who were mostly Alawis. The Syrian Army
bombarded Hama, a predominantly Sunni city
for several days. Victims of the bombardment,
estimated to have been close to 10,000, were
mostly Sunnis (Seale 1988). But this brutal
reprisal by the Syrian regime put an end to
armed revolt by members of the Muslim
Brotherhood.
Some other countries have known certain
tensions among people with diverse religious or
communal backgrounds that did not escalate into
full-scale civil war. In Egypt, for example, episodic
violence has been breaking out between Muslims
and Copts since the 1970s, including attacks on
Coptic churches. Complaints of offences against
religion were aired in protest marches organised
by Muslims and Copts alike, each attributing
responsibility for these offences to those
belonging to the other religion. The violence
triggered on these occasions was usually
contained, thanks to intervention by local leaders.
Inter-group tension led to massive protest
demonstrations in Bahrain as well, but it abated
with the adoption of a national charter in 2001
that promised to turn Bahrain into a
constitutional monarchy. The proclamation of
the charter was followed by the organisation of
legislative elections and the formation of the
Shura-Consultative Assembly, which included
representatives from the two major
communities, namely Sunnis and Shi’is, although
the latter felt that their numerical majority in
the country was not reflected in the composition
of this assembly. Newspapers also reported
manifestations by Shi’i intellectuals in the
eastern part of Saudi Arabia in the last few years
(Al-Rasheed 1998: 121–38). Certain conciliatory
measures were taken by King Abdallah upon
accession to the throne. Increased (even if
limited) freedom of expression, as well as the
general prosperity in the country thanks to high
oil prices have contributed to lessening Shi’i
discontent (Al-Rasheed 2007).
Differences of political identity, on the other
hand, have seriously threatened national security
in other Arab countries. The most important of
these political identities were those rooted in
interpretations of Islam as well as opposed
political affiliations in the cases of Occupied
Palestinian Territories and Lebanon. Islamist
militants, who believe that political systems in
Arab countries should be based on their own
interpretations of the principles of Islamic
Shari’a, were involved in armed clashes with
their governments. They also targeted those
whom they perceived to be secularist
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intellectuals. This confrontation brought a
decade-long civil war to Algeria, resulting in the
death of more than 100,000 people. Egypt,
Yemen and Saudi Arabia too have experienced
such clashes, although on a smaller scale. In fact,
such confrontations were echoed in most Arab
countries either as a result of actions by their
own Islamist militants or by Islamist militants of
other Arab countries.
As if it was not enough for Palestinians of
Occupied Territories to undergo violence
perpetrated by Israeli forces and settlers,
insecurity was also worsened by clashes between
different Palestinian factions. The most serious
of these clashes, involving the opposed forces of
FATAH and those affiliated with HAMAS,
resulted in the ousting of FATAH from Gaza in
July 2007.
Tensions also ran high in Lebanon between
November 2006 and July 2008 during the
confrontation between opposition forces led by
Hezbollah and those supporting the government.
The confrontation, which was originally meant to
be largely peaceful, engendered clashes between
supporters of each camp, particularly in Beirut in
2007, and escalated to the near occupation of
Beirut by the militias of Hezbollah in May 2008.
3 Identity-based conflict and regional security
Identity-based conflicts affected regional security
in differing degrees. Neighbouring countries
have either perceived these conflicts as a threat
to their own security or as an opportunity to
improve their leverage vis-à-vis their conflict-
affected neighbours or both simultaneously. Both
Syria and Israel were, for different reasons, so
concerned with the possible outcome of the
Lebanese civil war that the two intervened by
backing certain factions against others. In 1976,
Syria wanted to pre-empt a situation that could
push it to an unwanted war with Israel. And
Israel intervened in order to bar victory of hostile
factions who supported Palestinian resistance
organisations. Thus, Syria sent troops in 1976 to
back conservative Lebanese factions who were
about to be defeated by the forces of the
Lebanese nationalist movement. Israel on the
other hand, launched war in the summer of 1982
in support of the same Lebanese conservative
factions. This war brought its army to Beirut,
temporarily installed a government that was
friendly towards Israel, and forced Palestinian
armed factions led by Yassir Arafat to leave
Lebanon and seek refuge in Tunisia, far away
from Israel’s borders.
The Kurdish revolt in Iraq and the Iraqi Kurds’
desire for self-governing status were seen by
some regional actors as threats and by others as
opportunities. The revolt, with its eventually
favourable consequences for the Iraqi Kurds,
exerted a demonstration effect on Kurds in
neighbouring countries and aroused fear among
their governments that Kurds might aspire to
similar status. Such fear was felt strongly in
Turkey, whose government was so opposed to
Kurdish national aspirations that it almost
threatened to stop such independence by force if
ever Iraqi Kurds dared proclaim it. Additionally,
the Kurdish region in the north of Iraq was seen
by the Turkish military as a threat to Turkey’s
security, since fighters of the Kurdish Workers
Party (PKK) found sympathetic sanctuary among
its inhabitants. Turkish troops played havoc with
Iraqi sovereignty as they claimed the right of ‘hot
pursuit’ against their compatriots who found
refuge there. The Syrian government, which was
experiencing a Kurdish problem of its own, used
the PKK as a card to play against Turkey,
offering assistance and sanctuary to PKK
militants. The Turkish government in its turn
threatened to launch war on Syria if it continued
to back the PKK. Under heavy Turkish pressure,
the Syrian government closed PKK camps on its
territory. But even after this regional setback,
Syrian Kurds again organised in 2007 and 2008
to protest their treatment by Syrian authorities,
showing that the rising tide of Kurdish
nationalism in the region did not stop at Syria’s
borders (Gunter 2008; Yildiz 2008).
The conflict in Southern Sudan has affected
regional security in neighbouring non-Arab
countries such as Ethiopia, Eritrea, Chad and
Uganda, as governments of these countries
shared borders with Sudan and took opposed
positions towards both the Sudanese government
and rebels in the South or in Darfur. The
Sudanese government in turn backed rebel
groups in these countries. Thus, those forces
opposing the Sudanese government could find
sanctuary in neighbouring countries, while those
fighting governments of these neighbouring
countries acquired support from the government
in Khartoum. This state escalated into periodic
clashes between the Sudanese forces and
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neighbouring countries, particularly Ethiopia
and Chad, though overall security in the Arab
world was not much affected (Jok 2007).
While none of the three major ethnically framed
conflicts in the Arab world posed direct threats
to international security beyond the region, all
aroused interest among the big powers. The brief
Lebanese civil war of 1958 brought US forces to
Lebanon. The more protracted civil war of
1975–91 brought US troops again, accompanied
by detachments of French, Italian and British
soldiers following Israel’s invasion of the country
in June 1982, which led to the departure of
Palestinian fighters from Beirut. The Reagan
administration sent troops not out of any direct
concern for US security but out of worry that the
pro-Western Lebanese government might not be
able to impose authority over opposing Lebanese
militias. Another reason for intervention was to
give the impression that the US and Western
allies cared for the safety of Palestinian civilians
after the tragedy of Sabra and Chatila refugee
camps, where 700–800 Palestinians were
massacred by Lebanese Christian militias
supported by the Israeli army. Maintaining the
US and French troop presence in Lebanon did
not prove easy, and US marines had to leave
Beirut in March 1984 in the wake of a truck
explosion in Marines barracks in Beirut that
killed 241 US soldiers. A similar incident led to
the death of 56 French soldiers who also later
withdrew (Kelly 1996).
The attempt by the Iraqi government under
Saddam Hussein to crush the Kurdish rebellion
was not in itself a threat to US interests.
However, the situation in the North of Iraq
following the end of the US war of Kuwait in
1991 provided the USA, the UK and France an
opportunity to exert further pressure on the
Ba’athist regime and to show solidarity with an
ally that would prove to be indispensable when
the USA decided to invade Iraq later. The three
countries imposed a no-fly zone north of
latitude 36 in April 1991 in order to dissuade
the Iraqi airforce from attacking Kurdish
positions. This action enabled the Kurds to
enjoy peace in their own region and to exercise
de facto self-government, a state that was
consolidated with the adoption of an Iraqi
constitution that recognised de jure autonomy of
the region following US occupation of Iraq in
2003.
4 Islamist and other political identities as
perceived sources of regional and international
insecurity
Conflicts of identity stemming from opposed
views on religion in politics were seen as serious
threats to national, regional and international
security and such threats were of concern to
almost all Arab countries. Those that did not
experience armed attacks by militant Islamists
were wary that their activities in neighbouring
countries might have a contagious effect within
their own borders. Interestingly, those countries
that banned mainstream political organisation
were the ones that experienced the worst
domestic political violence between security forces
and militant Islamist factions (e.g. Saudi Arabia).
It is true that those countries that tolerated
mainstream Islamist movements, such as
Morocco, Jordan and Yemen, were not completely
immune to violent acts by militant Islamists. But
the threat in these countries was of a much more
limited and of intermittent character compared
with the protracted strife in countries banning
mainstream movements (Al-Sayyid 2003).
Armed militant Islamists were soon viewed by
Arab governments to be a regional and even
international threat. The regional character of
this threat was manifested in what was believed
to be coordination of activities of these groups in
several Arab countries. Those who carried out
the attack on the Ka’ba in 1979 came from
different Muslim countries. The young Egyptians
who tried to assassinate President Hosny
Mubarak in Ethiopia in 1995 came from Sudan,
where they had support from fellow Islamists in
ruling circles. In response, Arab governments
started to coordinate activities to combat
militant Islamism, and their ministers of
internal affairs, in charge of domestic security
would gather annually to discuss ways of
confronting this common ‘danger’.
This danger had acquired an international
character, long before the events of 11
September 2001. Osama Bin Laden had
established his World Islamic Front for Jihad
against Jews and Crusaders in 1998, three years
before the September 2001 attacks. His plan was
to fight those he considered enemies of Islam in
all parts of the world. Militants associated with
this organisation, which came to be known later
as the Qa’eda, struck against US interests in
Africa and South Arabia. Bin Laden was joined
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by young Islamists from many countries,
including both Arab and non-Arab parts of the
world. The worldwide response was not limited
to the so-called ‘war on terrorism’ launched by
US president George W. Bush, but it brought
together a vast network of countries, in the fight
against what they considered to be Islamic
militancy. These countries included the Russian
Federation, China, India, the Philippines, the
UK, France and Spain. A larger number of
countries sent troops to Iraq in response to calls
by Bush, who claimed that his military
occupation of Iraq was an attempt to crush a
regime that was allegedly supportive of ‘Islamic
terrorists’, a claim that was found later to be
entirely unfounded. The UN was drawn to this
effort as its participation was required in order
to trace sources of funding concerning those
associated with Bin Laden’s organisation in the
hope of denying them such resources.
Yet commitment to a militant interpretation of
Islam was not the only instance of a political
identity fuelling violent conflicts in Arab
countries. Espousal of divergent political ideals
could lead to similar consequences. Palestinians
favouring a vision of their future alongside Israel
have engaged in fighting other Palestinians who
believe that salvation lies with the annihilation of
Israel as a country of Jews that established itself
on territory these Palestinians consider
exclusively as their own. But although
commitment to these divergent ideals was a
source of tension between FATAH and HAMAS,
the bloody conflict between the two organisations
in the summer of 2007 was not caused by
philosophical differences, so much as by a naked
struggle over power. FATAH leaders did not easily
accept their electoral defeat by HAMAS in an
election that was considered by most observers to
have been conducted fairly and freely. The same
observation applies to the tense situation in
Lebanon between November 2006 and July 2008
that threatened to engulf Lebanon in a new civil
war and placed Christians and Muslims in the
two adversary camps. It would be difficult to
analyse this dispute solely in terms of identity,
although it was perceived in such terms by many
Shi’is and Sunnis in Lebanon and outside it,
particularly in Sunni majority countries including
Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan.
External support has also been crucial in
sustaining rebellions. Rebels in Southern Sudan
and Darfur enjoyed support from other African
countries, the USA and Israel. The Kurds in Iraq
had support from the USA, West European
governments and Israel. The Conservative
factions in the Lebanese civil war also had the
same sources of support, with Israel intervening
militarily to pre-empt victory of the allies of the
Palestinian organisations and to drive these
organisations away from Lebanon. External
support was not lacking for the two Palestinian
factions either. In the case of Algeria, Islamist
militants could also count on support from
Islamist organisations in other countries,
although their extensive networks inside Algeria
spared them the need for substantial external
backing.
5 Are there ways out of identity-based conflict?
A good starting point is to ask why identity-
framed conflicts broke out in countries like
Sudan, Iraq, Lebanon, Algeria and Palestine, but
not in countries like Morocco, Tunisia and
Jordan, at least not to the same degree of
duration, scope and impact on human security.
Lack of respect for the adversary, to use a notion
articulated by Geertz (1994), was common in all
these situations, but one can find signs of this
lack of respect for the ‘other’ in countries that
did not undergo similar conflicts. So why did
historically aggrieved or subordinated groups
revolt in these countries but not in the others?
One line of explanation is that improvements in
the economic and social conditions of
subordinate groups have seemed possible in the
second set of countries. Collective consciousness
along primordial or ideological lines has not been
as strong. And the different communities have
not experienced markers of identity as an
obstacle to upward mobility.
Such improvements have not occurred in most
countries experiencing violent conflict. The cases
of Sudan, Iraq and Lebanon suggest that
political tensions and violence have arisen when
legitimate rights to equal citizenship were
denied, starting with the right to declare and
acquire recognition for ethnic and other
identities. For instance, leaders in Sudan in 1984
and Iraq in 1975 soon reneged on their
commitments to respect terms of settlement of
civil disputes. In the case of Lebanon, Christian
parties saw, in the reform demands of the
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Lebanese Nationalist Movement, an end to the
special position of Christians in the country and
were ready to use force to quell any attempt to
change the National Pact of 1943, which
institutionalised their privileges.
In sum it is important to respect the cultural
rights of those perceived to be in minority
situations, and to respond flexibly to their
demands for autonomy ranging from
administrative decentralisation to a federal
arrangement. It has taken both the Sudanese
and the Iraqi governments a long time to begin
to negotiate with and recognise the rights of
rebel minorities, in Iraq’s case only in the
aftermath of very destructive and traumatic
external intervention – and in neither case has
such reconciliation been fully put into practice.
The delay has cost these countries protracted
and bloody civil wars in which hundreds of
thousands of people have either lost their lives or
suffered uprooting from their native lands.
Agreements to share power and wealth as in
Sudan, Iraq and Lebanon, have also played a role
in the restoration of peace. In Algeria and the
Palestinian Territories, the conflict has continued
at least in part because of the absence of such
agreement. The violence diminished (but did not
fully end) in Algeria after 1999 when an attempt
at reconciliation was made, but also when it
became clear that rebel groups could not win the
struggle against the government militarily. The
drive to take up arms against the government in
the name of Islam only began to run out of steam
when national reconciliation allowed some parties
with Islamist credentials to be part of the political
process and in fact to share in the government.2
Yet it would be simplistic to reduce all inter-
group tensions to socioeconomic causes and
differential access to political power. Identity
feelings of primordial, ideological or political
types are deliberately provoked and fed by
activists who hope to build a political capital out
of the manipulation of such feelings. They can
also flow from deep-rooted beliefs that generate
negative images of the ‘other’. However, neither
the manipulation of primordial loyalties nor the
survival of outdated images of the ‘other’ would
suffice to cause much inter-group tension or
conflict unless they coincided with differential
access to power, wealth and respect along
identity lines. Such inequalities must be
addressed in order to create sustainable peace in
the Arab world.
Al-Sayyid Identity and Security in Arab Countries68
Notes
1 Egypt and Algeria offer the best support for
this observation. Militant Islamists were
particularly active in poor districts of major
towns and in poor areas of the country.
Moroccan Islamists who perpetrated the
suicide bombings in Casablanca in April 2007
originated also from poor districts in the city.
Mainstream movements attracted support
usually among people of middle class, and
particularly those of middle-class professional
groups.
2 The Movement of Society for Peace took part
in presidential elections and parliamentary
elections and was part of a coalition
government after 2004. It is called HAMAS in
Arabic and is close to the international
movement of Muslim Brothers.
References
Al-Rasheed, Madawi (2007) Contesting the Saudi
State: Islamic Voices from a New Generation,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Al-Rasheed, Madawi (1998) ‘The Shi’a of Saudi
Arabia: A Minority in Search of Cultural
Authenticity’, British Journal of Middle Eastern
Studies 25.1: 121–38
Al-Sayyid, Mustapha Kamel (2003) The Other Face
of the Islamist Movement, Washington DC:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
Democracy and Rule of Law Project, Global
Policy Program Working Paper 33, January
Connor, Walker (1994) Ethnonationalism: The Quest
for Understanding, Princeton: Princeton
University Press
Corm, Georges (2005) Loubnan al-mo’asir, Tarikh wa
mujtama [Contemporary Lebanon: History and
Society], Beirut: Al-Maktabah Al-Sharqiyyah
Geertz, Clifford (1994) Primordial Loyalties and
Standing Entities: Anthropological Reflections on
Politics of Identity, Budapest: Collegiums
Budapest/Institute for Advanced Study, Public
Lecture No. 7, April
Gellner, Ernest and Waterbury, John (1977)
Patron and Client in Mediterranean Societies,
2AbelloColak40.2.qxd  18/02/2009  10:18  Page 68
London: Duckworth; Hanover: Center for
Mediterranean Societies of the American
Universities Field Staff
Ghareeb, Edmund (2003) ‘The Kurdish Issue’, in
Shams C. Enati (ed.), Iraq, Its History, People and
Politics, New York: Humanity Books
Gunter, Michael M. (2008) The Kurds Ascending:
The Evolving Solution to the Kurdish Problem in
Iraq and Turkey, New York: Palgrave Macmillan
Ibrahim, Saad Eddin (1998) ‘Ethnic Conflict and
State-Building in the Arab World’, International
Social Science Journal 50: 156
Jok Madut Jok (2007) Sudan: Race, Religion and
Violence, Oxford: One World
Kelly, John (1996) ‘Lebanon 1982–1984’, in
Jeremy R. Azrael and Emil A. Payin (eds), US
and Russian Policy Making with Respect to the Use
of Force, Washington DC: Rand
Luckham, Robin; Moncrieffe, Joy and Harris,
Colette (2006) Understanding the Routes In and
Out of Political Violence: An Assessment of the
Linkages Between Identity Politics, Exclusion,
Inequality and Political Violence in EMAD
Countries, Final Report to DFID, London
Seale, Patrick (1988) Asad of Syria: The Struggle for
the Middle East, with the assistance of Maureen
McConville, London: Tauris
UNDP (2009 forthcoming) Human Security in the
Arab World, New York: UNDP, ch. 2–3
Yildiz, Kerim (2008) The Kurds in Iraq: Past, Present
and Future, London, Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press
in association with Kurdish Human Rights
Project
IDS Bulletin Volume 40  Number 2  March 2009 69
2AbelloColak40.2.qxd  18/02/2009  10:18  Page 69
